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‘Mixed’ feelings about the EU–Mercosur
deal:
How to leverage it for sustainable
development
Before signing the EU–Mercosur trade agreement, the European Commission must deploy all
its legal instruments, in close cooperation with the Parliament and Council, to guarantee
strong sustainable development commitments from the Mercosur countries. The EU should
also avoid concluding the deal as a mixed agreement.
In June 2019, the EU and the Mercosur countries reached a 
 (FTA) after almost two decades
of negotiations, as part of an overall association agreement (AA). This FTA would establish the
largest free trade area that the EU has ever created, covering a population of over 780 million.
It would gradually (and only partially) open up the highly protected Mercosur economies and
establish a strategic partnership with a region where China recently replaced the EU as the
main trading partner. Updated EU FTAs with Mexico and Chile are also underway.
The European Commission is currently �nalising the agreement’s ‘legal scrub’ and translation
into all of�cial EU languages. Its next step is to submit it to the European Parliament and
Council for signing and conclusion, as well as to all 27 member states. Signing this FTA is a
priority for the current Portuguese EU Presidency.
However, the FTA is already strongly contested, mainly because of environmental and climate
concerns. Environmental and agricultural civil society organisations are rallying against the
agreement, while national or regional parliaments in Ireland, Austria and Belgium have
already adopted (non-binding) resolutions rejecting the agreement. Moreover, the European
Parliament’s recent 
 states that “the EU-Mercosur agreement cannot be rati�ed as it
stands”, a position that France also propagates.
Trade and sustainable development in EU free trade agreements
The main concerns surrounding the EU–Mercosur FTA relate to the deforestation of the
Amazon, the intensive agro-industrial model of the Mercosur countries, and Brazil’s weak
commitment to the Paris Agreement under President Jair Bolsonaro. The scope of its trade
and sustainable development (TSD) chapter has been criticised as being too limited, and its
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exempted from the general dispute settlement mechanism (which can lead to the suspension
of trade preferences in the case of non-compliance). Instead, they rely on a weaker
mechanism involving the monitoring by and consultation of a joint TSD sub-committee, civil
society domestic advisory groups and a panel of experts. The EU recently enacted this
procedure for the �rst time under the 
.
The Commission is increasingly being called upon to strengthen the scope and enforcement of
these TSD chapters. In May 2020, 
proposed incentivising the effective implementation of TSD commitments by rewarding
partner countries with the staggered implementation of tariff reductions linked to the
effective implementation of its provisions. Their non-paper also discusses the possibility of
withdrawing those tariff preferences in the event of a breach of those provisions. The
 expressed its support for this approach and called on the
Commission to explore a sanctions-based mechanism as a last resort. The European
Ombudsman also  the
Commission for failing to �nalise the EU–Mercosur FTA’s sustainability impact assessment
before concluding the negotiations.
In response, in its 
, the Commission promised a comprehensive review of its 
 on implementing and
enforcing TSD chapters effectively, by mid-2021. However, this review will only feed into
ongoing and future FTA negotiations and will therefore not impact the EU–Mercosur FTA. In
the meantime, the Commission – particularly its new Chief Trade Enforcement Of�cer – is
also strengthening the EU’s autonomous TSD enforcement toolbox by establishing a new
 that
would allow all EU-based stakeholders to lodge TSD-related complaints. Moreover, the
Commission will propose a mandatory environmental and human rights due diligence
instrument this summer. This instrument would require companies to address human rights
and environmental standards within their value chains. Later this year the Commission will
also adopt a legislative proposal aimed at minimising the risk of deforestation and forest
degradation associated with products placed on the EU market.
It is unlikely that these new tools will reassure or convince opponents of the EU–Mercosur
FTA. As both the Commission and the Mercosur countries have declared that they will not
reopen negotiations, the former is currently pursuing additional TSD commitments from the
latter. According to the Commission, “it needs meaningful results and engagement from
EU–South Korea FTA (https://trade.ec.europa.eu
/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2238)
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Mercosur countries before it can propose the agreement to the Council and Parliament for
signature and conclusion.”
In order to enshrine such additional TSD commitments into a legal document, the following
legal options are available:
1. A joint interpretation/declaration: The Commission envisages adopting a joint
statement or declaration that �anks the EU–Mercosur AA on (additional) TSD
commitments, such as on deforestation and the Paris Agreement. The Mercosur
countries have already expressed their willingness to establish such a joint legal
instrument but request that the commitments apply to the EU as well.
The format and scope of this �anking instrument still need to be determined. One option
would be that both parties (explicitly) agree that this document is an interpretative
instrument in the sense of Article 31 of the 
. The bene�t of
this option is that it would have legal force, be binding and would need to be considered by the
parties, arbitrators and panel of experts under the FTA’s dispute settlement procedures.
 used such a joint interpretative instrument in 2016 to persuade the Walloon
government to drop its veto against 
 (CETA). This joint instrument also included
clari�cations on the CETA’s TSD provisions. The binding nature of this instrument was
con�rmed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which 
 on this instrument in its landmark 
 to argue
that CETA is compatible with EU law.
The disadvantage of such a joint binding instrument is that it limits the option to go
signi�cantly beyond the commitments in the TSD chapter, preventing a more ambitious
approach. At best, it can include more ambitious commitments in a non-binding way (i.e. a
declaration of intentions).
2. A binding additional protocol: If the parties would aim to include additional TSD
commitments in a binding way, they can include these in an additional protocol to the
agreement. Such a protocol would legally be an integral part of the AA, but would not
require renegotiating the text of the agreement already agreed upon.
3. A non-binding joint roadmap: If the EU and Mercosur decide to take up more ambitious
commitments than those enshrined in the FTA without changing its text or adopting a
protocol, a �anking joint, non-binding roadmap or declaration would be the only
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf)
The EU and Canada (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13541-2016-
INIT/en/pdf)
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remaining option. Such a �exible, soft law instrument could include new TSD
commitments beyond those included in the AA, but cannot be legally binding. It could,
however, be adopted as a recommendation by the joint institutions under the AA once
the agreement is (provisionally) applied, and its implementation could be monitored by
the different bodies established under the AA (e.g. the TSD sub-committee and domestic
advisory groups).
4. Pre-signature or rati�cation commitments: The EU could identify a clear and ambitious
yet realistic set of pre-signature or rati�cation commitments that the Mercosur
countries must �rst meet before the European Parliament and Council sign and/or ratify
the agreement. Both the Commission and the Parliament have experience with this
approach (e.g. recently in the context of the EU–Vietnam FTA and Vietnam’s rati�cation
of several International Labour Organization Conventions). To fully use this leverage and
conditionality, the Commission, Parliament and Council should jointly come up with a
single roadmap for ambitious but realistic reforms and initiatives to be adopted by the
Mercosur bloc, including instruments and procedures for monitoring their effective
implementation (by e.g. the AA’s joint bodies).
5. Unilateral statements or declarations: Member states or EU institutions could express
their speci�c concerns or positions in unilateral statements or declarations, to be
entered into the Council minutes upon the signing of the agreement (like in the case of
CETA). Contrary to a joint instrument, such unilateral statements or declarations cannot
give a binding interpretation to the AA, nor do they constitute binding EU acts. Despite
their limited legal meaning, national governments often use them politically to reassure
critics in their respective constituencies about their concerns vis-à-vis the envisaged
agreement.
Quid mixity?
A �nal option that could facilitate the signing and rati�cation of the EU–Mercosur AA would
be to conclude it as an ‘EU-only’ agreement and not as a mixed one. This would imply that only
the EU (i.e. the European Parliament and Council) needs to ratify the agreement, avoiding 27
long and unpredictable rati�cation procedures by the EU member states. For example, the
provisionally applied CETA is still awaiting rati�cation by 12 member states.
After Wallonia’s temporary blockade of CETA in 2016 and the ECJ’s landmark 
on the EU’s broad, exclusive competences to conclude FTAs (with the notable exception of
portfolio investment and investor-state dispute settlement), the EU has concluded ‘split’ EU-
only trade agreements and mixed investment agreements with Vietnam and Singapore (and
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FTAs concluded in the context of AAs (with e.g. Mercosur, Mexico, Chile) must remain mixed.
However, there is no legal requirement to conclude AAs as mixed. This was evidenced
recently by the 
 (TCA), when the Council decided to exceptionally exercise the shared Union
competences for several of its provisions.
This option would not be ‘less democratic’ than a mixed agreement, as member states would
not lose their veto – AAs require exceptionally unanimity in the Council. The European
Parliament, which needs to approve the agreement, would guarantee democratic legitimacy
and parliamentary oversight over such an EU-only AA. 
, on
the other hand, should be encouraged further to strengthen democratic oversight over the
EU–Mercosur AA (and FTAs in general) indirectly by scrutinising the positions of their
respective governments in the Council.
Another option being considered within the Commission is to split the EU–Mercosur FTA
from the political part of the AA. Although legally possible, such a scenario seems unrealistic
as it would face strong opposition from the Council and member states.
The way forward
Not a single trade agreement in the world could solve the Mercosur countries’ many crucial
climate and environmental challenges – not even a modi�ed FTA with a sanctions-based TSD
chapter. But if the EU is to take its Green Deal and sustainable development objectives
seriously, it must leverage its trade power and tools to the fullest extent.
The European Commission should therefore deploy all the �anking legal instruments to
guarantee strong TSD commitments from the Mercosur countries, including strong
monitoring and implementation procedures using the joint AA bodies. Both the Parliament
and Council must be informed and consulted about the envisaged joint declaration ahead of
time to guarantee a strong and aligned EU position vis-à-vis Mercosur.
 
Guillaume Van der Loo is a Research Fellow at Egmont and EPC and a Visiting Professor at
Ghent University.
This Commentary is a joint EPC–Egmont publication, part of a broader partnership that
focuses on exchanging expertise and analysis on EU affairs and the EU’s role in the world.
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